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The Checkered Rise of Resilience. Anticipating Risks of 
Nature in Switzerland and Germany since 1800 
Nicolai Hannig ∗ 
Abstract: »Der Aufstieg der Resilienz. Die Antizipation von Naturrisiken in der 
Schweiz und in Deutschland seit 1800«. Both concepts, prevention and resili-
ence, are ways of thinking and acting that are very similar at first glance. Pre-
vention means optimising the present by anticipating the future. Crucial for 
the idea and practice of prevention is anticipating a risky future that should 
never become reality. Resilience describes a less radical manner of behaviour, 
which does not want to prevent risks per se. It stresses the ability to anticipate 
danger and to resist damage – if possible without losses. The terms “prevention” 
and “resilience” are still relatively young and have appeared infrequently in sys-
tems ecology, criminology and medicine since the early twentieth century. This 
article detaches both concepts from these fields and examines their heuristic po-
tential with the example of natural disasters. In order to shed light on the history 
of prevention and resilience, the essay focuses on various agents with their spe-
cific strategies and techniques. So beside the history of hydraulic engineering, it 
presents other examples from weather control, scenario planning and disaster 
research to insurance business. It argues that latest in the second half of the 
twentieth century arguments for prevention lost their credibility as risks during 
the technological change multiplied constantly. Strategies of resilience, howev-
er, seemed far more realistic in a phase of risk pluralization and replaced the 
paradigm of prevention in many areas. Yet prevention did not fully disappear, 
but rather became a part of the much wider overall strategy of resilience. 
Keywords: Prevention, resilience, natural hazards, hydraulic engineering, 
weather control, insurance, disaster research. 
1.  Introduction1 
In 1825 the hydraulic engineer Johann Gottfried Tulla from Baden published 
his famous treatise on “the rectification of the Rhine.” Had it appeared one-
hundred-and-fifty years later, people would have only been surprised at its use 
of unusual language. Yet its content represents almost entirely the Zeitgeist of 
the second half of the twentieth century. Without actually using the specific 
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terms, Tulla promoted a programme on environmental and security policies. 
His plan was to straighten the Rhine and thereby defend the region from flood-
ing and epidemic. Scholars have already written extensively on the corrections 
of the river (Blackbourn 2006; Bernhardt 1998). For this essay Tulla’s argu-
mentation to convince the funders of his project is of greater importance. He 
writes, “especially the personal safety of the people living at the banks of the 
Rhine and their exemption from the heavy strain of self-defence when the 
weather is stormy, wet or cold as well as securing their homes and cattle must 
be considered” (Tulla 1825, 5). In the course of his essay Tulla’s rhetoric de-
velops into a dramatic natural apocalyptic:  
“If the Rhine is not rectified,” Tulla writes,  
the thunder bells will not stop ringing, the dams will continue to burst, and 
soon this or that village and its council will be flooded; the swamps will not 
only not disappear but rather expand. The lowlands, which could still be used 
before, will later enhance the number of swamps because the groundwater will 
increase and its outflow will be prevented more and more (Tulla 1825, 51).  
Time, or to be more precise, future, obviously played a crucial role in Tulla’s 
plans. His strategy was to invent a future full of dangers which mankind could 
barely manage if it remained inactive. This calculation was typical for hydrology 
of the early nineteenth century. Since 1800 hydraulic engineering had become 
professionalized and eventually a part of state administration. A forecast future 
full of risks for human life and infrastructure opened its way, especially as engi-
neers provided precisely the technologies necessary to prevent these feared risks. 
At roughly the same time the German states of the Confederation of the Rhine, 
Prussia and Switzerland were undergoing an intensive phase of reformation in 
which the referrals of hydraulic engineering seemed to come right on cue. These 
countries hoped to reduce natural disasters by correcting rivers, making farm-
land arable as well as optimizing waterways for economic purposes. 
The leading Swiss exponent was Hans Konrad Escher, who devised his plans 
for correcting the Linth during the Helvetic Revolution around 1798 (Speich 
2003). He, too, predicted that the newly formed state could gain great security 
and economic upswing. Escher also drafted a future full of hazards in order to 
convince political authorities of the necessity of his project: “Order, love of work, 
diligence and economy will not protect them against shortage and poverty,” 
Escher wrote about the inhabitants of the Linth plain.  
They also cannot find refuge in the sanctity of their homes anymore. […] The 
floodwaters invade the basements of their houses, and here and there reach the 
first storeys. […] The population long since lives below its former standards; 
these weak, pale creatures without energy and spirit seem to be wandering 
shadows, haggard by the feeling of their own abatement, and even more by 
looking at their children, who clearly show prevalent degradation of mind and 
body so that in the end one is not only afraid of the earth’s engulfment but al-
so of entire mankind (Escher and Ith 1807, 5 et seq.).  
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The correction of the Rhine and Linth were mammoth projects and dragged on 
for decades. And they were merely a part of a fever of straightening rivers 
which gripped Switzerland and the German states in the nineteenth century. 
There was hardly a river that hydraulic engineers had not tried to straighten 
(Vischer 2003, 61-162; Summermatter 2007, 200-14). Although several of 
these hydro-engineering projects, realised since the nineteenth century by Euro-
pean states and their hydraulic engineers, could indeed reduce the number of 
floods significantly, times seem to have changed since the second half of the 
twentieth century. Ecology of renaturation was now opposed to the old hydrology 
topos of correction. In the 1980s hydraulic engineers considered human interven-
tion in natural landscapes a disruption of the ecosystem. Therefore, they estab-
lished means to create its original state again. The past seemed to replace the 
future as an agent for implementing a particular concept of hydrology. 
Yet the new field of environmental politics discussed not only Tulla and 
Escher’s methods. They criticized their line of argumentation, their anticipa-
tion of the future, indeed, their entire concept of prevention. During the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries the reception of (natural) disasters had changed 
considerably. The means for floods that Tulla, Escher and others had conceived 
of should also apply to further natural hazards, so to landslides, avalanches and 
even to earthquakes and tornadoes in the respective regions. Natural scientists 
and disaster researchers suggested to the government to differentiate more 
precisely between factual risks and purely hypothetical ones. The aim of this 
differentiation was not only to process the damaging events occurring but also 
those that were just considered possible. Thus, the disaster developed into a 
scenario whose occurrence had to be ideally prevented or whose effects had to 
be calculated and allayed (Hannig 2015, 33-65). Nevertheless, even this model 
of prevention propagated by Tulla and Escher as the crux for implementing 
their plans had lost its power of persuasion.  
The limits of prevention were at the same time also the opportunity for a 
new, different strategy: of resilience. Changes in dealing with floods are just 
one example of this shift. There are many other fields in which you can follow 
the footprints of this development, such as weather control, scenario planning, 
disaster research and insurance business. Although strategies to build up a 
resilient society can be traced back to earlier centuries, it is noticeable that 
especially in the field of natural hazards certain economic trends have reap-
peared since the eighteenth century. Preventive ideas concerning hydrology 
and, in particular, straightening rivers were the nineteenth century’s silver 
bullet against floods. But latest in the second half of the twentieth century 
arguments for prevention lost their credibility and acceptance because risks 
during the technological change were constantly growing. Of course, sciences 
continued their meticulous research on avoiding natural hazards before they 
even occurred. Strategies of resilience, however, seemed far more realistic in a 
phase of risk pluralization and eventually replaced the paradigm of prevention 
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in many areas (Itzen and Müller 2016, 16-7, in this HSR Special Issue). Yet 
prevention did not fully disappear, but rather became a part of the much wider 
overall strategy of resilience (Thoma 2014). 
In the 1970s the American disaster researchers Dennis S. Mileti and J. Eu-
gene Haas published a study presenting this change of thought (Haas and Mileti 
1976; Geipel 1977, 2-9).2 They faked a forecast for an earthquake reaching a 
magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter scale, which would occur in three years’ time. 
Mileti and Haas wanted to offer their experimentees the possibility to avert a 
disaster before it even arose because evacuations and other safety measures 
could be organized with enough time given. Subsequently, they spread relevant 
information to decision-makers in science, politics, media and economy, and 
then evaluated their reactions. Their results seemed cynical, yet instructive for 
the booming hazard research, which explicitly dealt with prognoses of disas-
ters. Mileti and Haas found out that the economic consequences would be more 
fatal for the alleged earthquake region than if there were no warning in ad-
vance. In their scenario, firms moved away, investment came to an end, trade 
tax sank towards zero. In this simulation prevention appeared to lead to a catas-
trophe before the catastrophe. However, not only the empirical results of this 
contemporary study are interesting. When they are historicized, you can recog-
nize that common concepts of prevention lost their appeal. To research on 
prevention thus also meant to reflect on former means of prevention and to 
therefore hinder even greater damage than caused by the natural hazard itself. 
In addition, it becomes clear that not only engineers and scientists were in-
volved but also sociology and economic studies. Contemporary surveys like 
these show that the history of dealing with disasters cannot be considered a 
success story of prevention. 
2.  Concepts of Prevention and Resilience in the Field of 
Natural Hazards 
Both concepts, prevention and resilience, are ways of thinking and acting that 
are very similar at first glance. Prevention means optimizing the present by 
anticipating the future (cf. Bröckling 2008, 38-48; Billis 1981, 367-79). Crucial 
for the idea and practice of prevention is anticipating a risky future that should 
never become reality. The present future, or seen from a historical perspective, 
the contemporary image of future, is always the starting point. At the same 
time preventive thought projects a risk-free present as an ideal onto the future, 
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and therefore attempts more at securing and hindering than creating and im-
proving. Yet prevention is still active in a two-fold sense: first, preventive 
thought designs precisely those futures that seem threatening. And then preven-
tive action offers help with a promise to avoid those futures. Defined as such, 
prevention can devise everything as a threat – criminality, disease, social inse-
curity as well as nature. It usually bases its interferences on scientific 
knowledge and thereby differs from other individual and spontaneous preven-
tion practice. Modern prevention commonly had its roots in systematic data 
collection, cause studies or prognostic. The base of preventive action was 
therefore the conviction of a changeable future (Makropoulos 2000, 79). 
Resilience describes a less radical manner of behaviour, which does not 
want to prevent risks per se. Similar to prevention, the term of resilience de-
rived from systems ecology as well as medical and psychotherapeutic contexts 
until it appeared more commonly in contexts of disaster research in the 1970s 
(Walker and Cooper 2011, 143-60; Bonß 2014, 14-31). Resilience stresses the 
ability to anticipate danger and to resist damage, if possible without losses. 
This can occur in different ways. Damaged areas can prove to be very robust 
and therefore not highly vulnerable. Furthermore, resilient systems strive for 
quick recovery after the event of damage in order to achieve their original state 
again – in sociology this is called the ‘bounce back effect.’ After all, resilient 
societies and their subsections try to acquire the competence to constantly 
change their structures and thereby react flexibly to potential damage. So it is 
important to them to achieve a fault-tolerant state of constant adjustability, 
usually with the help of supportive technologies and target-driven education. 
Here, states are just as responsible as are private companies (Edwards 2009; 
Folke 2006, 254-67). The triumphal march of resilience strategies we can ob-
serve nowadays is just as much an indication for the assumption that total pro-
tection can only be illusionary for a strongly dense infrastructure. Thus, one 
could add a motto to Ulrich Beck’s risk society: resilience seems more realistic 
than prevention. 
Historically, the concepts of prevention and resilience refer to a famous dis-
tinction: in the 1920s the economist and founder of the Chicago School, Frank 
Knight, postulated the differentiation between risk and uncertainty (Knight 
1921). His starting point was the assumption that not every risk can be calcu-
lated probabilistically; in some cases it can escape this control. Since then 
political, economic and sociological studies have used this distinction in the 
hope of separating old and new risk cultures. They seem to be right when con-
sidering genetically engineered or atomic risks. Yet risk analysts like to inte-
grate natural disasters sweepingly into this periodization and group them under 
the ‘new risk cultures’ without considering that in previous centuries especially 
natural phenomena like earthquakes or floods could lead to risks whose poten-
tial for damage were in no way inferior to the technological risks of the twenti-
eth century. However, in the field of natural disasters a distinction between risk 
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and uncertainty was applied during the twentieth century that can also be read 
as an expression of a change from prevention to resilience. 
With the increase of tight infrastructural networking the extent of damage 
also rose in the twentieth century. Large reinsurance companies such as Munich 
Re registered a nine-fold rise of the insured damaged goods and sixteen-fold 
the entire economic loss between 1950 and 1995 (Berz 1999, 427-42; 2009, 
129-41).3 Certainly, such rapidly rising figures were the reason for a change of 
mind and encouraged new forms of protection. To examine and outline the 
checkered and conflictual paradigm shift from prevention to resilience more 
precisely, one needs to refer to more sources than just economic loss curves. 
Therefore, in the following section I would like to examine the three most im-
portant agents of prevention and resilience with their specific strategies and tech-
niques. Furthermore, I will take a look at which societal circumstances formed 
strategies of resilience against natural hazards. In this way precisely those areas 
can be historicized that up to today still foster enhanced resilience. First and 
foremost, these are sciences and social sciences as well as the insurance sector, 
which have presented themselves as the impulse generators of governmental 
safety policy since the nineteenth century. But even politics triggered several 
innovations that steered dealings with natural disasters on new courses. 
3.  Agents of Resilience: Politics, Science and Insurance 
3.1  Politics 
Let us therefore start with politics as the first example of an agent of resilience. 
During the nineteenth century, protection against natural hazards was gradually 
nationalized. Around 1800 building authorities of the German states and Swiss 
cantons began organizing disaster management, thereby slowly taking it away 
from the responsibility of individual landowners and residents (cf. Summermat-
ter 2005; Speich 2003; Fischer 2003, 272-81). In the twentieth century this 
tendency towards nationalization expanded to establishing authorities for disas-
ter control and other specialized organizations under national jurisdiction. 
In Germany, the Technische Nothilfe (technical emergency assistance) as the 
third institution besides the fire brigade and medical services was responsible 
for tasks of civil protection, floods and fires. During the Third Reich, the Na-
tional Socialists tried to release it from their responsibilities and hand disaster 
management over to the Sturmabteilung (SA).4 Yet there were still several 
                                                             
3  Nonetheless, the death toll sank slightly.  
4  A letter from SA Gruppenführer Arthur Rakobrandt to the regional administration of Bayer-
ische Ostmark and other offices, 22.1.1936, in: Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Bestand In-
nenministerium, Signatur 71702. 
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floods where the expertise of the Technische Nothilfe was needed (Kunze 
1938). In the Federal Republic the organization resumed its work as the Tech-
nisches Hilfswerk (technical relief organisation). Now civil protection was a 
matter of the states and, thus, in the hands of the interior ministries. After the war 
civil defence and disaster protection started to be reformed. The federal ministries 
also began building up their own departments for disaster protection. These, in 
turn, set up new federal laws to regulate the areas of authority and worked on 
concepts on how the government should deal with possible disasters. 
Strategies that civil security research later subsumed under the term ‘prepar-
edness’ were highly sought after by the West German post-war government 
(Collier and Lakoff 2008). Already since the 1920s there was a trend to rely on 
less invasive risk management. Therefore, more and more voices drew atten-
tion to the dangers created by prevention techniques themselves. Especially the 
“enforced relocation[s] of river banks” had led to shifting farmland and settle-
ments closer to the water, which, in turn, formed new risks. The government 
wanted to encounter this threat by building weirs and specialized services for 
safeguard, which had previously been established only sporadically on local 
levels. The task of these services was not preventing hazards like floods per se, 
but rather limiting the inevitable extent of damage and, thus, optimizing the 
phase of recovery after the shock.5  
After the Second World War this shift to concepts of resilience continued. 
Civil servants started to organize simulations in order to guarantee smooth 
operations during a catastrophe. From a military point of view the roots of this 
technique go back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In the Cold War 
simulations as well as scenarios had their heyday, especially in the USA, and 
became well-established as a method of simulation to overcome political and 
military crises (Collier 2008; Ellebrecht, Jenki and Kaufmann 2013, 240-50). 
As for the Federal Republic of Germany, first experiments to try out similar 
methods of simulation were carried out very soon after the Second World War, 
too. Thus, authorities transferred these military techniques to civilian areas. To 
my knowledge, the first simulation was run by the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior in 1951. Its typology, aim and procedure are well-documented. The 
report of the ministry states:  
In a simulation a situation which is made up but close as possible to reality is 
played through with the help of a plan and maps. The acting participants are 
selected from the present group of people. The simulation is instructed doctri-
nally to them by people chosen beforehand. […] Every simulation is based on 
a supposition, a so-called situation or practice situation that explains briefly 
                                                             
5  A letter from Ludwig Ritter von Knözinger, district president of Upper Bavaria to all de-
partments of roads and rivers of the district and the section for construction and mainte-
nance of torrents in Rosenheim, 6.4.1927, in: BayHstA, Bestand Innenministerium, Signatur 
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what has happened up to then. This situation is a substitute for reality, the base 
of all events in the game.6 
The spectrum of catastrophe scenes drawn up by the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior was wide. As to natural hazards, various types of flooding scenarios 
dominated due to the state’s geography. Yet this first organized simulation 
dealt with a completely different type of flood:  
“Since the early morning of the 11th of June of an unknown year,” the pref-
ace remarks,  
groups of people are suddenly, constantly and for no apparent reason flocking 
into the Northeast districts of Bavaria. […] The reports from the border offices 
state that these are people who are arriving partly without belongings, partly 
with aimlessly packed inventory on foot, bicycle or agricultural, horse-drawn 
carriages. They are flooding the border districts and sections are moving 
southwest towards the county’s interior.7 
The Free State of Bavaria considered military East-West conflicts at its Eastern 
borders absolutely realistic at the beginning of the 1950s, so the riot police 
force had to act out several scenarios of the refugee issue. 
Simulations like these created a dreadful future that chosen groups of people 
could experience. These artificially designed experiences were supposed to 
damp the risks in the present. A later evaluation of the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior states: simulations must “give suggestions on how to fight catastrophes 
to all of the authorities, offices and organizations involved in disaster control.” 
In addition, these “authorities, offices and organizations” should be inspired to 
“check their disaster prevention means and – if necessary – improve them.”8 So 
the work of the governmental offices responsible was directed towards the future 
in its approach; nevertheless, the character of this bureaucratic way of prevention 
was rather conservative. The respective departments considered prevention to be 
first and foremost an optimization of management. In this logic risk seemed 
acceptable and did not have to be fought as such or even avoided fully.  
With this technique of scenarios a new type of data production emerged that 
was meant to be useful for risk analysis (Parker 2014). Simulations provided 
the opportunity to measure social behaviour as well as the functionality of 
organizational procedures empirically. Certainly, the idea was that scientific 
and technological solutions had their limits and that preventive measures, de-
vised to not let the potential source of danger ever occur, were not feasible. 
With this new, more or less sociological, data basis authorities wanted to im-
prove their reaction in the case of a disaster. So the government did not in fact 
                                                             
6  Erstes Lehrplanspiel Schutz in Katastrophenfällen (Lagen Naila, Hof, Münchberg und Mo-
schendorf), in: BayHStA, Bestand Präsidium der Bereitschaftspolizei, Signatur 31.  
7  Ibid. 
8  A letter from Wilhelm Hoegner, 3.12.1953, in: BayHStA, Bestand Innenministerium, Signatur 
M 1500.001. 
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turn its back on general, forward-looking practices of disaster control. Rather, 
their epistemology changed. Simulations made the future that preventive 
measures tried to hinder perceptible. So desired reactions towards extreme 
events were practised (Ellebrecht, Jenki and Kaufmann 2013, 237 et seq.). It 
was not the first time this technique was applied – especially in the military 
context manoeuvres were commonly performed. However, transferring them to 
dealings with natural hazards and other civilian threats in an attempt to com-
pensate the limits of insurability acquired a new quality here.  
Generally, this disaster management expresses a fundamental attitude to-
wards natural threats: namely that post-war states did not just fear danger. They 
partly relied on threats, used them for calculations and often saw hazards as an 
argument for governmental action. Paradoxically, risks could therefore threaten 
the state and secure it at the same time. On the federal state level, the ministries 
tried to closely regulate the areas of responsibility in the event of a disaster, 
such as high water, floods, bridge collapses, storms, epidemics, etc., to remit 
“to the administrative body responsible for the specific field of disaster.” The 
rhetoric of the German government was, however, remarkably defensive, for 
example, when it merely required to keep “damage and loss of the national 
wealth as slight as possible”9 Although the departments differentiated distinctly 
between “preventive” and “protective” disaster control prevention was often 
perceived as working on and with plans for protection, which – comparable to 
simulations – should optimize behaviour in the event of a disaster.10 Hence, the 
formation and organization of disaster control relied indeed heavily on strate-
gies of resilience. The ministries tried to regulate behaviour during the catas-
trophe and did not address the dangerous event as such. 
3.2  Science 
A second example of a modern prevention and resilience agent is science. 
Concerning its prevention techniques, science operated far more radically than 
the state’s bureaucracy in the nineteenth century although its action cannot, of 
course, be examined without its close relationship to the government. It was 
considerably earlier than the so-called “age of scientification,” whose begin-
ning is usually set in the 1880s (Szöllösi-Janze 2004), that particularly geology 
and its related disciplines, such as seismology, volcanology or hydrology, 
                                                             
9  Letter from Wilhelm Hoegner, 18.4.1951, in: BayHStA, Bestand Innenministerium, Signatur 
92158. Cf. also Rechtliche Grundlagen und Organisation des Katastrophenschutzes, Zivil-
schutz 32 (1968): 75-82. 
10  Letter from the undersecretary Herzog to the department IC of the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior, 23.3.1965, in: BayHStA, Bestand Innenministerium, Signatur 92158. Some associa-
tions criticised the fuzzy usage of the term “prevention“ again and again; cf. the letter from 
the administrative district association of Bavaria to the Ministry of the Interior, 29.3.1968, 
in: ibid. 
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raised society’s awareness for natural hazards. They were often the ones who 
paved the way for prevention. Yet also in the twentieth century you come 
across some radical techniques of prevention, such as controlling or modifying 
the weather – a technique that is nowadays examined especially in the contexts 
of Cold War Science (Achermann 2013; Fleming 2010, 165-88; Harper and 
Doel 2010; Kwa 2001). But when these attempts of weather control are de-
tached from these contexts, an important trail leading to a dispute over ad-
vantages and disadvantages of preventive strategies becomes visible. 
In 1948 the agricultural office of the Swiss Department of National Econo-
my organized a concerted action: the battle against hail in the canton of Tessin. 
The plain of Magadino in Southern Switzerland was impassable moor land-
scape far into the nineteenth century. Apart from countless germs, the plain 
inhabited only a few shepherds who could use parts of it for pasture. Yet cor-
rections at the end of the nineteenth century had made this previously wildly 
meandering river, the Tessin, into an almost straightened canal, and thus also 
the moor area into an agricultural area, which is still used intensively today. 
The cultivated fields were fertile and promised good harvests. Nonetheless, the 
farmers had to deal with large-scale crop failure as the Magadino plain also 
belongs to one of Switzerland’s regions with the most hail. People wanted to 
prevent this danger – not only with insurances but also with technology 
(Mauelshagen 2014; Oberholzner 2015). Since the late eighteenth century 
scholars and nature lovers had discussed the possibility of fending off hail, 
commonly with the help of canons to disperse the arising clouds (cf., e.g. Hein-
rich 1789). These techniques were gradually improved; engineers met at Inter-
national Congresses of Hail Shooting, and insurances benefitted in their tariffs 
landowners who used hail canons (Fleming 2010, 81-4). Italy, France, Germa-
ny, Switzerland and Austria even set up several institutions for shooting clouds 
(Bouiller 1990). Although its efficiency always remained uncertain its technol-
ogy was still attractive because it assured true prevention by not even letting 
the feared hail occur.  
Thus, the hopes put into hail shooting are just a part of prevention history as 
are the constant clean breaks with this practice attempted by science. Even in 
1907 the Austrian meteorologist and Privy Councillor Josef Maria Pertner 
postulated after extensive experiments that the end of war on the clouds had 
approached. Probably Pertner himself knew that this meteorological clean 
break was only a half-hearted one, especially when considering that up to date 
science had not delivered a convincing theory on the formation of hail (Pertner 
1907). To end speculations on its usefulness, shortly after the Second World 
War the Swiss Department of Agriculture started a five-year, large-scale exper-
iment in the Magadino plain in cooperation with the Meteorological Central 
Department as well as, tellingly, the Swiss Hail Insurance Company. Once and 
for all it wanted to clarify “whether the hail defence rockets common in Swit-
zerland and that accord to the Swiss standards can prevent the formation of hail 
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or not.” The result was disillusioning to many farmers who were convinced of 
the efficiency of hail shooting. 
“We conclude,” the Swiss commission wrote, “that there are no signs point-
ing to plausible explanations for the hail preventing effect of the rockets used 
in our large-scale experiment.”11 It is astonishing that despite this expensive 
and elaborate experiment the practice of hail shooting did not go out of fashion. 
Quite the contrary, farmers merely ignored these scientific results, relied on 
their practical experiences and invested independently in new varieties of this 
technology that had proven to be reliable in their view. In regions of hail, local 
politicians therefore saw potential to make a mark in these initiatives. The 
Bavarian district of Rosenheim, for example, also started a large-scale experi-
ment between 1957 and 1967 on behalf of the federal state parliament and 
supported by state funds – although it had knowledge of the outcome in Swit-
zerland (Achermann 2013, 231-33, 236 et seq.). Silver iodide rockets and pro-
pane generators were tested, and since 1975 the citizens of Rosenheim began 
injecting clouds with these chemicals by aircraft (Gimple 1984; the welcoming 
speech of the federal state parliament of the district Rosenheim by Dr. Max 
Gimple in Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Verkehr 1985). 
Amateur researchers worked hard on alternative methods, such as the ‘noise 
canon’ whose acoustic waves should mix up the atmospheric layers to produce 
rain instead of hail. But all of these techniques were marginalized by meteorology 
or even disclaimed totally in most cases (Bayer. Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft 
u. Verkehr 1985). In light of this background other researchers, in turn, favoured 
strategies of resilience and therefore tried to keep the damage slight with the 
help of nets and other coverings (Weidner 1977). Yet the adherents of hail 
shootings did not drift off the course of prevention reaching back into the 
eighteenth century. This example shows that there was not a smooth shift to-
wards strategies of resilience in every field.  
However, hydraulic engineering welcomed the renunciation of preventive 
measures more unanimously. Here you can see a striking turn towards strate-
gies based on resilience. What is remarkable is that hydrology brought together 
concepts of resilience with ideas of sustainability. Indeed, both concepts were 
even mutually dependent although recent discussions in German-speaking 
countries give the impression that resilience theories are a further development 
of the concept of sustainability (Thoma 2014; Kaltenbrunner 2013, N2). In the 
twentieth century hydrotechnological interventions were now not only trig-
gered by nature’s threat; politics and environmental movements stressed the 
topic of endangered nature more and more, and not only demanded protection 
                                                             
11  All quotes are from the final report of Eidg. Kommission zum Studium der Hagelbildung und 
der Hagelabwehr über den Grossversuch Nr. 1 zur Bekämpfung des Hagels auf der Magadi-
noebene (Tessin) 1948-1952, in: Bundesarchiv Bern (CH-BAR) E7220A#1970/53#205, Az. 
410, Allgemeines, 1955. 
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from water but also its protection (Stern 2006, 17-24). In addition, many previ-
ous promises of prevention could not be kept. For example, from the Pyrenees 
in the eighteenth century to North America in the early twentieth century peo-
ple commonly assumed that deforestation of mountain areas prevented floods; 
a view shared by both forestry scientists and politicians, too (Pfister and Bränd-
li 1999; Lübken 2014, 239-47). Yet during the last century this promise of 
prevention lost its persuasive power. 
This is also and especially true of hydrotechnology, which even produced 
new risks according to its opponents (there were also many other critical voic-
es, for example, André 1828; Schindler 1878). Many correction projects had 
actually widened and excelled the flow of rivers so that, in part, the middle and 
lower courses had to transport enormous rates of runoff. Areas that could have 
served as detention reservoirs had disappeared, thereby shifting the risk of 
flooding to a local level. Furthermore, river regulations had determined areas 
for settlement that had been pure swamp or flood regions before the correc-
tions. However, the risk exposure in regions close to water was now enhanced 
(Götz 2002). Finally, these river engineering projects had generated constant 
cost responsibility since the nineteenth century, which meant a high mainte-
nance burden for states and cantons. Especially in Switzerland a long period 
without bigger hazards in the twentieth century had led to neglecting servicing, 
which had fatal consequences during the floods of the 1970s and 80s. The 
amount of damage totalled to over 2.5 billion Franks when high water joined 
the Reuss in the canton Uri in 1987 from the area of the Gotthard to the Lake 
Urner and damaged dams that were in part one hundred years old (Müller, 
Zimmermann et al. 1997, 43-84; Bundesamt für Wasserwirtschaft 1991). 
Events like these, together with an enhanced environmental agenda, caused 
a change of hydraulic engineering’s objective. Action groups, such as the 
Schaffhausener Aqua Viva or the Rheinaubund that campaigned in the 1960s 
and 70s explicitly for the protection and recovery of semi-natural waters, de-
manded to combine the concepts of flood control more strongly with the ideas 
of sustainability (Skenderovic 1994). By no means were these demands unchal-
lenged, and particularly not in the early 1960s. Authorities of hydrology by all 
means questioned whether costly torrent control should be kept up. They 
thought, for example, that “nature should rather take its course, because in the 
play of forces […] a calmer and more stable state would be achieved” (Glarus 
1963, 10 et seq.) But they mostly decided in favour of hydrotechnological inter-
vention. So the danger by nature still overtrumped the endangerment of nature. In 
discussions the “danger of substantially serious interferences with economy and 
traffic” had to “be banned,” wrote Swiss hydraulic engineers in 1913. “What has 
to be checked” was “only the matter to which extent such work should be tack-
led today” (ibid., 11). 
Nevertheless, a change of thought came to the fore. The aims of flood pre-
vention were changing and now relied more and more on resilience strategies. 
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The first legislative changes and draft papers in the 1970s and 1980s finally 
announced what hydrology had been implementing latest since the extreme 
floods of 1987 and 1993, namely abandoning hazard prevention primarily based 
on technological measures (Bundesamt für Wasserwirtschaft 1992). In fact, au-
thorities saw it as their task to prepare people for a rise of floods, for example, by 
stopping settlement of and construction in risky areas near rivers (B[eat] Jo[rdi] 
2002). These more or less ‘passive’ protection schemes were to precede inva-
sive measures, such as interventions through water constructions, and to reduce 
them to a minimum (Bundesamt für Wasser und Geologie 2001). 
The blueprint for this change in strategy came from a completely different 
setting. During the twentieth century even the social sciences rushed into the 
market of prevention agents. As so-called Disaster Studies, originating mainly 
in the USA, they developed models that offered basic, preventive attempts to 
regulate human behaviour in the case of a catastrophe (Knowles 2011). While 
American catastrophe sociologists initiated first field research on “human be-
haviour in disaster” after the Second World War, Europe needed until the 
1970s to find an equivalent group of researchers (Fritz and Marks 1954; Steh-
renberger 2014). For example, in Bavaria a new focus on geographical risk 
research formed around the geographer Robert Geipel at the Technical Univer-
sity of Munich. The main reason for this was the earthquake in Friaul in the 
Northeast of Italy in 1976, which Geipel analysed according to sociological 
aspects. Although there had been single trends towards social geography in 
Frankfurt and Munich since the 1950s, its establishment only occurred roughly 
twenty years later. Geographers connected descriptions of catastrophes and risk 
considerations more closely with behavioural research and surveys on devel-
opment planning in areas of disasters (Geipel 1977, 13-20; Steuer 1979; 
Geipel, Pohl and Stagl 1988).  
It was no coincidence that earthquakes were their focus of research. Unlike 
meteorological events like floods and hurricanes, earthquakes occur without 
any warning. So with this background in mind a shift towards more sociologi-
cal perspectives seems to present a contemporary understanding of the limits of 
prevention. “Earthquakes present long-term provisional problems for the de-
signing geographer, especially in urban agglomerations,” Geipel pointed out 
himself (Geipel 1977, 21). A way out of this dilemma of prevention was shown 
in studies examining behaviour in the case of a disaster. The geographers ac-
cepted so to speak the proper natural phenomenon as well as its unpredictabil-
ity. In so far they expanded the term of risk of natural hazard in a very substan-
tial manner. They researched in particular the interaction of meteorological, or 
rather seismic, hazards and social, region-specific vulnerability – a perspective 
that is currently celebrating its revival in environmental history. 
Elsewhere and at the same time another disaster research group was founded 
which worked exclusively sociologically. “Psychobiology” was the name of this 
committee the German Federal Republic established in the “Defence Committee 
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of the Minister of the Interior” in 1970, led by Lars Clausen, a sociologist from 
Kiel. Yet soon after the psychobiologists had started their work first tensions 
developed. In the eyes of the Federal Office for Civil Defence, the work of the 
group seemed too theoretical and too little application-oriented (Dombrowsky 
1995). Still, it was the first time that sociological disaster researchers addressed 
the public. These sociologists focused not only on post-catastrophe, but also on 
pre-catastrophe research. They propagated the thesis that “natural disasters” did 
not in fact exist, only “cultural catastrophes.” Clausen and his assistant Wie-
land Jäger therefore decoupled industrial disasters and natural hazards from 
their contingent character and described them more as a process, a “form of 
radical and rapid social change” (Clausen and Jäger 1975, 23). So the researchers 
did not emphasize the spontaneity of a critical situation analytically, but rather 
presented themselves as agents of resilience who knew how to steer behaviour in 
the case of a catastrophe so that collateral and property damage could be reduced 
to a minimum. Disaster research should not merely deal with single events, but 
also with civilizational chain reactions. In consequence, they conceptualized 
earthquakes and floods in the context of problematic constructions and em-
bankments, just like the Swiss hydrology did slightly later (Jäger 1977). 
Thus, the view of nature by German federal disaster research correlated 
clearly with that of the environmental movement. By stressing the exploitation 
of resources and man’s lack of adapting to his environment, sociologists made 
human beings the main culprits for disasters and demanded a more rational 
handling of natural phenomena. Nonetheless, they did not only use environ-
mental issues as an explanation. Especially in England where a “Disaster Re-
search Unit” had been founded at the University of Bradford researchers no-
ticed that particularly in developing countries the extent of damage after 
disasters had risen strongly. For them the socio-economic aspects that deter-
mine society’s vulnerability in the case of a disaster were relevant, and not so 
much the proper natural phenomenon. In the rhetoric of the researchers the 
earthquake of Guatemala in 1977 soon became the “classquake” (O’Keefe, 
Westgate and Wisner 1976, 566 et seq.). At the same time disaster research 
developed new resilience strategies by reinterpreting natural hazards as cultural 
hazards, and by offering a view of social and infrastructural resilience. Accord-
ing to this logic, civil protection did not have to mean preventing floods or 
tornadoes. This would be almost impossible because they are natural occur-
rences. Rather, it meant avoiding too dense settlement in river areas, relying on 
safe constructions, and through coordinated crisis management not letting 
natural occurrences become disasters.  
3.3  Insurance 
Finally, the third example refers to the player whose mere profession is sub-
scribed to organizing the future: insurance. It was also the insurance companies 
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who coined the term ‘risk’ as explicitly future-orientated to provide a frame-
work for their field of work. Through calculation and anticipation the insuranc-
es’ mathematical minds turned dangers into risks, made them seem controllable 
and capitalized them (Bonß 1995, 147-90). Accordingly, a close connection 
between insurances and disasters can be traced back into the early modern 
period when great city fires, the shipping industry and trade with colonial 
goods encouraged the establishment of a commercial insurance industry 
(Zwierlein 2011). During the nineteenth century this connection intensified. 
With this cooperation of politics and economy new debates arose again and 
again in Switzerland and Germany about how to insure against floods and other 
natural hazards (Lübken 2008; Wanner 2003). Yet due to lack of statistics as 
well as the difficulty of predicting natural hazards, the insurance branch was 
cautious about entering the field of natural disasters. It is thanks to the founda-
tion of reinsurances that an equivalent market could develop and thrive. Rein-
surance is a business model that insures insurances. Since the mid-nineteenth 
century it has brought new dynamics into the market. With the rise of large 
firms, such as Swiss Re or Munich Re, the insurance branch became more and 
more international and finally developed global markets of natural hazard in-
surances at the beginning of the twentieth century (cf. Borscheid 2012; Gugerli 
2013). Insurances against different types of natural hazards all over the world 
soon became branches of the Swiss and Munich Re, although they were not 
their main sources of income. However, the Great Earthquake of San Francisco 
in 1906 as well as the following debates led by insurance companies on which 
damages were in fact caused by the earthquake and which by the subsequent 
fire linked these firms closely to the sector of natural hazards (Röder 2006).  
Subsequently, it was mainly the initiatives of the insurance industry which 
led to a stronger data collection and prediction of natural risks to render them 
market-based. In addition, the way politics dealt with natural hazards was also 
shaped by the insurances’ influence. The French sociologist Francois Ewald 
wrote in the 1980s, “Insurance constitutes the real core of modern societies,” 
and thus alluded to the general change of human security needs (Ewald 1989, 
385). Natural hazard prevention was an important part of this change. It be-
came commercial and focused gradually on loss adjustment, on financial pre-
vention schemes, so to speak. Seen from the point of view of the insurances, 
potential disasters in the future meant first and foremost the financial ruin of 
residents, firms or states, and this should be prevented by the possibility of 
providing insurance policies. But at the same time they shifted responsibility: 
similar to disaster research, the logic of insurances took away the responsibility 
from nature by making society compensate the consequences with its own 
means. With this in mind, Ewald points out a change in solidarity because 
insurance is “an alternative to the cooperative form of protection and to state 
support” (Ewald 1989, 387). However, dyke associations and other supportive 
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societies did not become obsolete. From then on provision could be delegated 
far more easily to professional suppliers who certified contractual rights. 
During the twentieth century the insurance market changed significantly 
again. Declining margins and the intrusion of direct insurers into the business 
were threatening the reinsurance companies. Thereupon, Swiss Re and Munich 
Re shifted their business towards supplying expertise. The industry now per-
ceived itself as an interface that not only paved the way for individual financial 
loss adjustment but also offered specific preventive ideas on how to avoid 
damage. At Swiss Re as in the industry of direct insurers, you can trace this 
shift from risk management to risk engineering back to the 1930s and 1940s 
(cf. Gugerli 2013, 147-50). 
In 1928 the Swiss Department of the Interior summoned a special commis-
sion. It comprised politicians and representatives of the large insurances who 
should examine ways of insuring the cantons against elemental damage (Report 
of the Swiss Federal Council to the Federal Assembly 1928). In this newly 
created “Federal Commission for Examining Aid for Damages by Natural 
Hazards” the board appointed Hermann Lanz-Stauffer, director of the intercan-
tonal reinsurance association, “expert of the Federal Department of the Interi-
or.” He then began collecting information from the cantonal forestry offices on 
the amount of damage caused by natural hazards.12 Significantly, there were 
barely any statistics in this regard. It was only thanks to Lanz-Stauffer’s initia-
tive that a systematic collection of data, supported by the federal government, 
was gradually built up.13 Already in 1936 Lanz-Stauffer, together with Curt 
Rommel, was able to publish a 1500-page study that joined scientifically based 
risk research with insurance maths. With pioneering pragmatics the authors 
also defined what “natural risks” were. Thus, their study looked only at dangers 
“where a natural force suddenly and mechanically causes damage.” This in-
cluded high water, floods and storm tides as well as different types of land-
slides, storms and avalanches. Everything else, such as earthquakes, heat, frost, 
etc., was excluded (Stauffer and Rommel 1936, V). Demarcations like these 
had serious consequences because they prioritized specific fields of disaster 
prevention in an economic way. 
At the end of the 1960s a sheer wave of foundations of internal research in-
stitutes within the reinsurance companies was triggered, which once again 
exemplifies the branch’s change of thought. On the one hand, engineers were 
part of this ‘scientification’ and became more and more important for evaluat-
                                                             
12  Letter from Hermann Lanz-Stauffer to Eidgenössisches Oberforstinspektorat Bern, 7.8.1929, 
in: CH-BAR E3270A#1000/755#233, Az. 1.09, Schätzung der durch Naturgewalten wie 
Hochwasser, Sturm, Lawinen, Erd- und Felsrutschungen und dergl. an den schweizerischen 
Waldungen alljährlich im Durschnitt entstehenden Schäden, 1929.  
13  Letter from Stellvertretung des Oberforstinspektors Bern to Lanz-Stauffer, 15.8.1929, in: 
ibid.  
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ing large risks of airports, dams and oil rigs (Gugerli 2013, 290-5). On the 
other hand, the reinsurers specifically recruited geologists and meteorologists 
because the industry of natural hazards was growing. The market was becom-
ing opaque due to denser infrastructure. At Swiss Re this newly founded re-
search institute was the department of “risk management,” at the British Com-
mercial Union Assurance Company the “Commercial Union Risk Management 
Limited” and at the Munich Re “Geo Risk.” This phase of foundation coincid-
ed both with the change of strategies in hydraulic engineering as well as the 
manifestation of academic disaster research. Here, the firms were working in a 
less technological or sociological manner. Rather, they combined geological 
and meteorological research with actuarial methods.  
Contemporary concept papers show that the insurances’ aim was to perceive 
risks, then analyse and evaluate them as well as prevent and diminish them. 
Therefore, the work of these firms went farther than pure financial compensa-
tion for damage claims. For example, agents of resilience employees made 
“risk visits” to Singapore, Taiwan or Libya where they offered workshops or 
initiated publication series, advised new types of earthquake-proof construction 
or taught successful crisis management. They considered themselves “special-
ists for risks” and therefore saw it as their duty to participate in discussions on 
resilience. As the initiator of risk management of Swiss Re claimed at the end 
of the 1970s, society had developed a “new awareness for risks.”14 
The scientization of the insurance industry, visible since the 1930s and 
1940s, was now enriched with a new dimension. Before, the industry relied on 
external expertise, but now the degree of specialization of the academic disci-
plines did not suffice anymore. To redefine themselves as risk engineers the 
reinsurers recruited scientists and specialized them further internally. A new 
kind of resilience research developed that was both industry specific and firm 
internal. Its commercial background was certainly visible at times, but public 
attention was nevertheless huge (Berz 1999; Gleich 1998).15 Up to today the 
surveys on damage and long-term data collections of Munich Re and Swiss Re 
are used both by journalists and scientists for empirical data after severe disas-
ters (cf. the current brochure: Munich Re 2011). 
4.  Conclusion: From Prevention to Resilience 
During the nineteenth century the concept of prevention acquired huge, sugges-
tive power and seemingly privileged prevention over protective, corrective and 
                                                             
14  All quotes are from „Künftige Tätigkeit der SR in RM“, 20.9.1978, in: Unternehmensarchiv 
der Swiss Re, Sign. 10.166820.00.009. 
15  For example, in 1998 the magazine Focus called the founder of the department for geo risk 
at Munich Re. 
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curative methods (cf. Bröckling 2008, 40). This inevitably had to lead to an 
exaggeration of the use of prevention. “He who wants to prevent will never 
know enough,” the sociologist Ulrich Bröckling describes the dilemma of 
prevention (Bröckling 2008, 43).  
Risks may only be identified probabilistically, which is the reason why pre-
ventive thought tends to generalize probabilities. Statistics, or to be more pre-
cise, set points, gain great importance because deviations from them mean 
starting points for prevention. So prevention can easily become an obligation. 
But for precisely this reason the history of prevention also has to check in how 
far its concepts and techniques can become threats in themselves. Prevention 
always created new risks, be it through straightening rivers or controlling 
weather. It often massively endangered on-site lifestyles and altered the land-
scape’s physiognomy.  
During the twentieth century prevention lost through these threats its signif-
icance as the ideal solution for natural hazards. It was science, namely hydrau-
lic engineering, geology and meteorology, that exposed prevention as utopian, 
although their own predecessors had implored that general prevention of disas-
ters could be realized. Yet private landowners and single districts still adhered 
to prevention as shown by the example of hail. The crisis of prevention was 
simultaneously the chance for a concept that was definitely not new but devel-
oped extraordinary radiance: resilience. The term itself, as a defined concept of 
treating natural hazards, only appeared towards the end of the twentieth centu-
ry, but what it represented, namely the ability to be prepared, durable and flexi-
ble, is a much older idea.  
In the insurance industry, politics and science strategies of resilience became 
en vogue since the mid-twentieth century – not least because they were ex-
posed to failure and partly had fewer requirements than technical or scientific 
methods. They conceived dangerous natural phenomena as normal and regular 
events. At the same time, the insurance business became an expert on risk 
research and advised authorities or single organizations in many parts of the 
world on how to prepare for great damage. Ministries organized simulations in 
which they re-enacted major emergencies to train their authorities’ reactions. In 
addition, concepts of resilience paved the way for other disciplines, such as 
sociology, to contribute to societal and governmental hazard prevention. There-
fore, attention shifted away from the menacing natural hazard towards human 
behaviour, or rather, towards the organization of human behaviour in the event 
of a disaster. 
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